GLO Clough Global Opportunities Fund

Item 1. Reports to Stockholders.

Section 19(b) Disclosure

Clough Global Dividend and Income Fund, Clough Global Equity Fund, and Clough Global Opportunities Fund (each a “Fund” and collectively, the “Funds”), acting pursuant to a Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) exemptive order and with the approval of each Fund’s Board of Trustees (the “Board”), have adopted a plan, consistent with each Fund’s investment objectives and policies to support a level distribution of income, capital gains and/or return of capital (the “Plan”). In accordance with the Plan, the Funds’ managed distribution policy sets the monthly distribution rate at an amount equal to one twelfth of 10% of each Fund’s adjusted year-ending NAV, which is the average of the NAVs as of the last five business days of the prior calendar year.

Under the Plan, each Fund will distribute all available investment income to its shareholders, consistent with each Fund’s primary investment objectives and as required by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”). If sufficient investment income is not available on a monthly basis, each Fund will distribute long-term capital gains and/or return of capital to shareholders in order to maintain a level distribution.

Each monthly distribution to shareholders is expected to be at the fixed amount established by the Board, except for extraordinary distributions and potential distribution rate increases to enable each Fund to comply with the distribution requirements imposed by the Code.

Shareholders should not draw any conclusions about each Fund’s investment performance from the amount of these distributions or from the terms of the Plan. Each Fund’s total return performance on net asset value is presented in its financial highlights table.

Each Board may amend, suspend or terminate each Fund’s Plan without prior notice. The suspension or termination of the Plan could have the effect of creating a trading discount (if a Fund’s stock is trading at or above net asset value) or widening an existing trading discount. Each Fund is subject to risks that could have an adverse impact on its ability to maintain level distributions. Examples of potential risks include, but are not limited to, economic downturns impacting the markets, increased market volatility, companies suspending or decreasing corporate dividend distributions and changes in the Code. Please refer to the Notes to Financial Statements in the Annual Report to Shareholders for a more complete description of its risks.

Please refer to Additional Information for a cumulative summary of the Section 19(a) notices for each Fund’s current fiscal period. Section 19(a) notices for each Fund, as applicable, are available on the Clough Global Closed-End Funds website www.cloughglobal.com.

Distribution to Common Stockholders

The Fund intends to make monthly distributions to common shareholders according to its managed distribution policy. The Fund’s managed distribution policy is to set the monthly distribution rate at an amount equal to one twelfth of 10% of the Fund’s adjusted year-ending net asset value per share (“NAV”), which will be the average of the NAVs as of the last five business days of the prior calendar year. The Board of Directors approve the distribution and may adjust it from time to time. The monthly distribution amount paid from October 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020 was $0.1008 per share and the Fund paid $0.0967 per share monthly between January 1, 2021 and October 31, 2021. At times, to maintain a stable level of distributions, the Fund may pay out less than all of its net investment income or pay out accumulated undistributed income, or return of capital, in addition to current net investment income.

Performance of $10,000 Initial Investment (as of October 31, 2021)

The graph shown above represents historical performance of a hypothetical investment of $10,000 in the Fund since inception. Past performance does not guarantee future results. All returns reflect reinvested dividends, but do not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

To Our Investors:

For the fiscal year ending October 31, 2021, the Clough Global Equity Fund (“GLQ” or the “Fund”) was up 36.34% on net asset value (“NAV”) and 63.73% on market price. The Fund’s benchmark, the MSCI World Index, was up 41.08% for the same period.

The end of 2020 and the first ten months of 2021(fiscal year 2021) has seen the markets rally on economic re-opening momentum and then stall on fears of persistent inflation and rising interest rates all while dealing with multiple new COVID variants. Across the globe, government interference in the technology sector in China has raised investor concerns about the future of the world’s largest economy’s equity markets. We offer our thoughts on these two topics along with our view on the rise of the electronic vehicle sector below.

Information technology, financials and consumer sectors were the largest contributors to performance during fiscal 2021. Specifically, equity holdings in software, mortgage finance and electronic vehicles created positive returns for the Fund. Securities used to hedge the portfolio were the largest detractors to performance during the fiscal year. Short positions, index hedges, as well as longer duration U.S. Treasuries decreased returns the most during the year.

A Contrary View on Inflation

Supply interruptions, higher costs and slower demand as stimulus runs off are driving the consensus to expect a slower economy in 2022. And with private balance sheets so large, the recent rise in bond yields also points to slower growth in 2022. That begs the question whether the rise in prices is a one-time adjustment as we crawl out of pandemic-induced supply restrictions, or the beginning of a sustainable inflation pattern that continues in the years ahead?

If goods and labor shortages are pandemic-induced, that suggests the stagflation thesis, which calls for weak growth accompanied by uncontrollable price increases, is unlikely. We have no historical economic precedent to make secular predictive judgments like this. Never before has the global economy been shut down for eighteen months, and no one has yet figured out how to get all of it back up.

Pricing power is usually temporary. Price increases in goods are coming from a scramble to build inventories in the face of bottlenecks on the production front which will ultimately be fixed. Durables spending is still running 30% above trend while income growth is slowing, and once spending slows and supplies become more available, price gains will be more difficult to sustain. The risk we see is that retailers may find themselves with excessive high-priced inventories in 2022 once deliveries pick up. That is possibly the reason the ten-year U.S. Treasury yield is struggling to get to 2%.

Capacity utilization is in the mid-70s and labor force participation is roughly in the 65-70% range, so the slack is there. Higher wages presumably will draw more workers back into the labor force. Meanwhile, China is restricting credit as real estate prices there are declining, likely bringing many globally traded commodities with them. COVID-19 cases are reportedly declining in Southeast Asia, perhaps easing the semiconductor supply crunch. The positive to all this is slower demand growth will give the U.S Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) room to slow the move to tapering. The sharp rise in deposits which translated into money growth did not come from credit creation but from income transfers, and that matters. Meanwhile the dollar is strong and global savings continue to outpace investment, creating a sustainable flow of liquidity from the private sector in Japan, Europe, the U.S. and now China. This is a prescription for sustaining low interest rates over time and is equity supportive.

We think the right strategy in current circumstances is to remain invested in equities and to balance the portfolio between growth, focused on technology and healthcare in 2022. We also see the shortages in housing as long lasting. The Fund continues to hold positions in home builders, mortgage finance and title insurers.

Electric Vehicles

One thing is certain about electric vehicles (“EVs”): production should increase substantially. Most estimates call for growth from about 2% of vehicles produced today to 25% by 2025 and 50% by 2030. That is 10x and 20x growth. It is likely vehicle models will proliferate, and charging stations will become more available and standardized. Virtually every developed country is incentivizing EV use and subsidizing investment.

While EV automobile manufacturers get the press coverage, we believe the investment opportunity may reside more along the supply chains. While the Fund holds Tesla Inc., largely because of the company’s scale and technology lead, our holdings also include two China-based companies, Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. and BYD Co Ltd., both large battery manufacturers. Common estimates maintain that by 2030, perhaps 300-400 gigawatt hours of battery capacity will be required to support the EV fleet, but it is more likely that closer to 3 terawatts, or ten times that much battery power, will be required to power both the 30 million electric vehicles that will be on the road at that time plus the storage needs to support the part of the grid powered by solar. 75% of North American energy supply in the U.S. is scheduled to be provided by wind and solar by 2050, and the grid has to move wherever the power is produced.

Scale is everything and the power train is where the real intellectual property (“IP”) for EVs resides. Not only are Chinese manufacturers now dominant in the production of batteries used in Chinese built EVs but they are prepared to move into global markets. Scale determines not only unit costs, but also the miles per kilowatt hour the vehicles can produce. Should even 20 million EVs be produced by say 2025, and Tesla builds 20% of them, the number of vehicles produced by Tesla will be 4x its current capacity and it should be able to produce vehicles far below competitor costs. Even today, Tesla can price Model 3s in Singapore from its Shanghai plant at roughly the cost of a Toyota Corolla and can generate a more than 20% cash return on operating assets. Contemporary Amperex Technology is investing enough capital to reach sales capacity several times its current size by mid-decade. The company is also ensuring its supply chain to the point it has taken stakes in the critical mining companies which supply it and is building an integrated platform. The company grew revenues 131% and profits 130% year-over-year in the Q3 2021 and demand for the company’s lithium ion batteries could rise another 150% in the coming year.

While BYD Co. Ltd. has been manufacturing plug-in vehicles since 2012, and is the world’s largest producer of electric buses, its engineering leadership is in battery manufacturing. All of its vehicles are powered by the company’s homemade lithium-ion batteries. Lithium-ion batteries don’t go dead in cold weather and offer better mileage, and since these batteries are designed to use some of the most abundant materials in the world, like lithium, iron and phosphate rather than more limited materials like cobalt and nickel, the company should find it easier to scale. Wherever the materials are mined, they are shipped to China where 75% of lithium-ion batteries are made. That leaves most producers outside Asia far more limited in their ability to grow.

It is unclear to us what advantages legacy U.S. internal combustion automobile (“ICE”) manufacturers bring to the electric vehicle world and it is equally questionable how profitable their EVs will be. Ford Industries Inc. is expected to spend $11 billion along with SK Innovation Co Ltd. to build integrated complexes in Kentucky and Tennessee to build enough batteries to power one million EVs by 2025 according to an article in Barron’s. General Motors Co. is expected to spend $35 billion on EVs. But Tesla will have four automobile production plants in operation by late 2022 and is already producing 900,000 EVs annually today (Source: Company Reports). General Motors announced it will stop producing gasoline powered vehicles by 2035, so that suggests the company-owned IP related to the ICE world will lose value.

China

We have long had an interest in China, but American investors seem more perplexed about it than at any time in the past. Geopolitics between the two countries are tense and real estate activity, which generates about 20% of China’s output, is once again in turmoil led by the fallout from China Evergrande Group’s debt defaults. Overseas listings by Chinese companies have slowed to a crawl.

Yet trade between the two countries continues to grow and American financial firms are being welcomed. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs Group are all taking full ownership of what were once securities joint ventures with Chinese firms. BlackRock Inc. is now beginning the process of managing China’s vast and growing private wealth stock, something even the government realizes Chinese banks are ill-equipped to do. And the China internet stocks are cheap.

China’s policy has always aimed to reduce real estate leverage and the initiative that brought down Evergrande reflects the government’s desire for stability, even at the expense of profits. That suggests China’s housing market is too big to fail and government will intervene to avoid debt liquidation, and the likelihood of any systemic collapse has a low probability. China’s 40% savings rate makes intervention and debt reduction quite doable. The government has already announced that Evergrande’s domestic investors will be paid off, including those customers who purchased unfinished apartments. That alone limits the likelihood of contagion. China has issued very few outstanding foreign bonds, and only huge global institutions like Blackrock Inc. own them.

But in all of this lays a larger question. Is China, under Xi Jinping’s nationalistic policy drives, taking the nation back to a Maoist socialistic economy? The policies he is pursuing seem heavy-handed and capricious. The search for a “common prosperity” can mean anything, including more than a reduction in social inequality to providing more support for workers and overstressed youngsters. Is the private economy in danger of being snuffed out? We don’t think so.

For one, we would argue China is more capitalistic than Europe. The private economy is responsible for its wealth and its jobs, and China could not reach its geopolitical targets without a vibrant private sector. Its local governments depend on private businesses, particularly developers, for almost all its revenues. For what it’s worth, China today has the lowest taxes in the developed world.

It is important the government continue to support development of the middle class, but that will be combined with attempts to promote self-reliance in technology and natural resources. It aims to reduce dependence on Western suppliers, which leave China vulnerable to trade restrictions. We expect a dramatic turn toward “buy China” in coming months and we think the breakout to new highs in the domestic Shanghai A-share market attest to that.

Our strategy is simple: go where the money goes. And it is now being used to bolster domestic Chinese companies. Two sectors stand out in our view: (1) as noted above, China will be responsible for building more than half the electric vehicles over the next decade and most of the supply chain will be developed there; China already accounts for 10% of new EV sales in Europe; and (2) we would argue China’s housing stock will always need investment, as much of China’s housing was built for a 20-year life and many of the cranes you see in city centers are to replace construction made 20-30 years ago.

The attack on American-listed initial public offerings (“IPOs”), particularly the Internet stocks, began when President Xi watched Twitter remove then-President Trump from its app, essentially cutting off the podium he used to address the American people. This was viewed by some as an unforgivable affront to an authoritative head of state and demonstrated how powerful the mega-cap technology platforms had become. China has resolved the matter and our sense is once whatever regulations China comes up with are resolved, the stocks will bottom. China is 100 years behind the U.S. in corporate regulatory efforts, but it will quickly catch up. That is the opportunity.

As always, please don’t hesitate to reach out to us with any questions or comments.

Sincerely,

Charles I Clough, Jr.

Robert M. Zdunczyk

This letter is provided for informational purposes only and is not an offer to purchase or sell shares. Clough Global Equity Fund (the “Fund”) is a closed-end fund, which is traded on the NYSE American LLC, and does not Equity Fund issue shares for sale as open-end mutual funds do. The market price of a closed-end fund is based on the market’s value.

Although not generally stated throughout, the information in this letter reflects the opinions of the individual portfolio managers, which opinion is subject to change, and is not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results or investment advice.

The Morningstar Global Allocation Index represents a multi-asset class portfolio of 60% global equities and 40% global bonds. The asset allocation within each class is driven by Morningstar asset allocation methodology. To maintain broad global exposure and diversification, the index consists of equities & fixed income and utilizes global, float-weighted index methodology to determine allocation to U.S. and non-U.S.

The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of 23 developed markets countries. Both indices referenced herein reflect the reinvestment of dividends. Effective July 31, 2010, the MSCI World Index returns prior to January 1, 2002 were revised to reflect the total returns, with dividends reinvested, reported by MSCI. The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or redisseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. None of the MSCI information is intended to constitute investment advice or a recommendation to make (or refrain from making) any kind of investment decision and may not be relied on as such. Historical data and analysis should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of any future performance analysis, forecast or prediction. The MSCI information is provided on an “as is” basis and the user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use made of this information. MSCI, each of its affiliates and each other person involved in or related to compiling, computing or creating any MSCI information (collectively, the “MSCI Parties”) expressly disclaims all warranties (including, without limitation, any warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, timeliness, non-infringement, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose) with respect to this information. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall any MSCI Party have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, punitive, consequential (including, without limitation, lost profits) or any other damages (www.msci.com).

The Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index measures the performance of the U.S. investment grade bond market. The Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond index invests in a wide spectrum of public, investment-grade, taxable, fixed income securities in the United States, including government, corporate, and international dollar-denominated bonds, as well as mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities, all with maturities of more than 1 year.

The blended indices, 50% MSCI World/50% Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index and 75% MSCI World/25$ Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, have been calculated by Clough Capital Partners L.P. based on the sources listed above.

The performance of the indices referenced herein is used for informational purposes only. One cannot invest directly in an index. Indices are not subject to any of the fees or expenses to which the Fund is subject, and there are significant differences between the Fund’s investments and the components of the indices referenced.

The net asset value (“NAV”) of a closed-end fund is the market price of the underlying investments (i.e., stocks and bonds) in the Fund’s portfolio, minus liabilities, divided by the total number of fund shares outstanding. However, the Fund also has a market price; the value of which it trades on an exchange. This market price can be more or less than its NAV.

RISKS

An investor should consider investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses carefully before investing. To obtain an annual report or semiannual report which contains this and other information visit www.cloughglobal.com or call 1-855-425-6844. Read them carefully before investing.

The Fund’s distribution policy will, under certain circumstances, have certain adverse consequences to the Fund and its shareholders because it may result in a return of capital resulting in less of a shareholder’s assets being invested in the Fund and, over time, increase the Fund’s expense ratio.

Distributions may be paid from sources of income other than ordinary income, such as net realized short-term capital gains, net realized long-term capital gains and return of capital. Based on current estimates, we anticipate the most recent distribution has been paid from short-term and long-term capital gains. The actual amounts and sources of the amounts for tax reporting purposes will depend upon the Fund’s investment experience during the remainder of its fiscal year and may be subject to changes based on tax regulations. If a distribution includes anything other than net investment income, the Fund provides a Section 19(a) notice of the best estimate of its distribution sources at that time. These estimates may not match the final tax characterization (for the full year’s distributions) contained in shareholders’ 1099-DIV forms after the end of the year. For the fiscal year 2021, the Fund’s distribution policy resulted in distributions of capital in the amount of $23,035,803.

The Fund’s investments in securities of foreign issuers are subject to risks not usually associated with owning securities of U.S. issuers. These risks can include fluctuations in foreign currencies, foreign currency exchange controls, social, political and economic instability, differences in securities regulation and trading, expropriation or nationalization of assets, and foreign taxation issues.

The Fund’s investments in preferred stocks and bonds of below investment grade quality (commonly referred to as “high yield” or “junk bonds”), if any, are predominately speculative because of the credit risk of their issuers.

An investment by the Fund in real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) will subject it to various risks. The first, real estate industry risk, is the risk that the REIT share prices will decline because of adverse developments affecting the real estate industry and real property values. In general, real estate values can be affected by a variety of factors, including supply and demand for properties, the economic health of the country or of different regions, and the strength of specific industries that rent properties. The second, investment style risk, is the risk that returns from REITs—which typically are small or medium capitalization stocks—will trail returns from the overall stock market. The third, interest rate risk, is the risk that changes in interest rates may hurt real estate values or make REIT shares less attractive than other income-producing investments. Credit risk is the risk that an issuer of a preferred or debt security will become unable to meet its obligation to make dividend, interest and principal payments.

Interest rate risk is the risk that preferred stocks paying fixed dividend rates and fixed-rate debt securities will decline in value because of changes in market interest rates. When interest rates rise the value of such securities generally will fall. Derivative transactions (such as futures contracts and options thereon, options, swaps, and short sales) subject the Fund to increased risk of principal loss due to imperfect correlation or unexpected price or interest rate movements. Compared to investment companies that focus only on large companies, the Fund’s share price may be more volatile because it also invests in small and medium capitalization companies.

Past performance is neither a guarantee, nor necessarily indicative, of future results, which may be significantly affected by changes in economic and other conditions.