RNS Number : 4570I
Prospect Epicure J-REIT Val Fd PLC
19 November 2008
Prospect Epicure J-REIT Value Fund PLC
Quarterly Update to Quarter End September 2008
Report to Shareholders
The report below combines the third quarter Investment Adviser's report and an additional update from the Investment Adviser, covering
the period post 30 September 2008, which saw unprecedented levels of volatility on the Tokyo stockmarket.
A FORMATTED VERSION OF THIS REPORT IS AVAILABLE FROM THE COMPANY'S ADMINISTRATOR, GALILEO FUND SERVICES LIMITED, ISLE OF MAN UPON
REQUEST. PLEASE CONTACT enquiries@galileofs.co.im TO REQUEST A COPY.
Disclaimer
The contents of this document have been prepared by Prospect Asset Management Inc. as Investment Adviser to Prospect Epicure J-REIT
Value Fund PLC ("PEJR" or "the Company"). This document has been prepared solely for information purposes and for the use of the recipient.
It does not constitute an offer or an invitation by or on behalf of the Investment Adviser or the Company to any person to buy or sell any
security or investment product. Any reference to past performance is not necessarily a guide to the future. The information and analyses
contained in this publication have been compiled, or arrived at from sources believed to be reliable, but the Investment Adviser and the
Directors of the Company do not make any representation as to their accuracy or completeness, and do not accept liability for any loss
arising from their use. The investments discussed in this report may not be suitable for all investors and are provided for information
purposes only. The ordinary shares and warrants in the Company have not been, and will not be, registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933 as amended (the "Securities Act") or qualified for
sale under the laws of any state of the United States or under the applicable laws of any of Canada, Australia, Republic of South Africa or
Japan and, subject to certain exceptions, may not be offered or sold in the United States or to, or for the account or benefit of, US
persons (as such term is defined in Regulation S under the Securities Act) or to any national, resident or citizen of Canada, Australia,
Republic of South Africa or Japan. None of the Company, the Manager or any of their respective members, directors, officers or employees nor
any other person accepts any liability whatsoever for any loss, however arising, from any use of such information or opinions.
Company Description
Prospect Epicure J-REIT Value Fund plc (" the Company") was established to capitalise on investment opportunities in the Japanese real
estate investment trust (J-REIT) market. The Company is actively managed in order to capture valuation discrepancies, in particular
discounts to NAV, as identified by the Investment Adviser. The Company typically invests in listed securities, but is also permitted to
invest a portion of its assets in unlisted securities expected to list within twelve months, in addition to securities that have ceased to
be listed.
Investment Overview
At the end of the third quarter the Company held 14 positions in what the Investment Adviser believes to be undervalued J-REITS. One new
position, B-LIFE (8984), was established in the third quarter due to its compelling valuation, and one small position in Premier (8956) was
liquidated. In order to increase diversification and to further reduce the Company's overall volatility, the Investment Adviser was
considering establishing several new positions, market conditions permitting.
The Investment Adviser has made regulatory filings with the relevant Japanese authorities, declaring a greater than 5 per cent ownership
in a number of J-REITS, held across all its managed funds. The weightings below represent the percentage of shares outstanding of the
respective J-REITS under the Investments Adviser's administration, advice or management, and include the Company's own holdings, which have
been acquired in line with its pre-agreed strategy.
Symbol Security % of Inv Units PEJR % of Issued Inv Units PAMI
8975 FC RESIDENTIAL 22.43 46.50
(REIT)
8970 JAPAN SINGLE RESI 13.76 32.93
(REIT)
8963 TGR INVESTMENT 15.67 32.28
(REIT)
8969 PROSPECT RES (REIT) 4.09 24.04
8966 CRESCENDO INVESTMENT 5.64 11.17
(REIT)
8984 BLIFE INVESTMENT 2.26 7.20
(REIT)
8980 LCP INVESTMENT(REIT) 5.12 6.66
8985 NIPPON HOTEL FUND 2.28 5.06
(REIT)
Source: Prospect Asset Management as of 30 September 2008
A subsidiary of the Company owns 4.09% of 8969, Prospect Residential Investment Corporation, a JREIT that is managed by a company
affiliated to the Investment Adviser, Prospect Asset Management
Portfolio Gearing and Currency
Subsidiaries of the Company use credit lines provided by Citigroup which the Investment Adviser constantly monitors; the level of
borrowing and gearing levels may be adjusted as deemed necessary to take advantage of market opportunities. During the quarter the
Investment Adviser made best efforts to maintain the gearing of the Company at the targeted 75 per cent level. Gearing at the end of
September 2008 was 86 per cent, as compared to 82 per cent at the end of June 2008. Investors should be aware that these figures reflect
leverage at the subsidiary company level only, and that the Company held additional funds at the parent company level.
The Global Credit Crunch Becomes Localised
The J-REIT index continued to struggle, losing 18.8 per cent during Q3 2008, as global stock markets repeatedly suffered days of
historic declines. The apparent attractions of the Japanese property market (high occupancy rates, stable rents), and of J-REITS (low
relative gearing, and steady dividends) were overwhelmed by refinancing fears and the global credit crunch. Previously the Investment
Adviser has written about how the exit of several major US investment banks from the Japanese property lending business has created a
funding gap in the market. This situation was exacerbated during the third quarter 2008 as many Japanese banks and financial institutions
curbed new loans to real estate firms and accelerated the recovery of outstanding debts; this virtual shut-down of the credit market has led
to significant difficulties in the refinancing of loans approaching maturity; the only remaining option being to repay by selling off
properties.
Credit: From the Latin "credo", or "belief".
Many industry participants are quick to point out that the current weakness arises from credit contraction, rather than from an economic
crisis or concern over real estate fundamentals. One of the cornerstones of finance is managing duration risk. In most cases banks have to
match short term assets, such as deposits, with long term liabilities, such as loans. One measure of the lack of risk appetite can be seen
in the banks' unwillingness to lend, even though the duration mismatch is in their favour. The greatest rise in interest rates has been seen
in short term loans, even though for residential J-REITS tenants are signing two year leases. Perhaps the most graphic barometer of risk
aversion can be found in the TED spread, the gap between the three month T-bill and three month Libor. This is essentially a gauge of how
willing banks are to lend money to each other. As indicated in the chart below, the spread has ballooned in recent months.
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a graph depicting the TED Spread.
Source:Bloomberg
Real estate lending by Japanese banks to the real estate sector has fallen every quarter for the past six quarters and is expected to
fall further. According to Credit Suisse, bank lending to real estate is at 14 per cent of overall lending, above the 12 per cent level hit
during Japan's era of asset inflation. Some analysts are forecasting that credit will remain tight until real estate bank lending falls to
11 per cent of overall loans.
Several real estate firms, including J-REITS, are attempting to reduce credit risk by selling their properties and paying back loans.
But potential buyers are finding fund raising difficult, resulting in a significant fall in the market's liquidity. The tighter credit
conditions have resulted in a dramatic rise in the number of bankruptcies in the real estate sector, led most recently by Zephyr (8882) and
Urban (8868). If the credit crunch continues for an extended period, non-performing loan levels at the banks could grow further. However,
the Japanese authorities have in recent years appeared to be more open to admitting and correcting policy mistakes. It is worth remembering
last year's draconian increase in building safety standards, which resulted in a precipitous fall in new housing starts. The authorities
quickly backtracked and housing starts are now rising year on year, albeit from somewhat artificially low levels. In a similar vein, there
has been anecdotal evidence of a change in lending conditions to small developers, with banks seemingly now more willing to roll over loans. There are also indications of an easing of the
regulations affecting J-REITS, allowing for mergers, buy outs and privatizations, all of which should help the J-REIT market to recover.
Lastly the Investment Adviser anticipates that equity funding from overseas will return, as self funding groups snap up distressed assets.
In the immediate term, the traditional valuation argument in favour of purchasing J-REITS trading at discounts to book value has been
turned on its head: While share price corrections as of 30th September have left 34 of the 42 quoted J-REITS with price to book ratios of
less than one, this is now seen by the market as potentially negative i.e. a signal that it will be more difficult to generate the equity
financing essential for growth. Since J-REITS distribute virtually all of their profits as dividends, they need to combine borrowing with
equity issuance to acquire properties and achieve growth. Clearly any new shares issued at times when the share price is at a discount to
book value would be dilutive to book value per share. On the other hand, failure to issue equity prevents a fund from exercising leverage
and increasing borrowing, leaving it unable to acquire properties. Growth is stunted in either case, and price to book is likely to remain
below one. This dilemma has resulted in a further widening of the valuations between the larger J-REITS which can obtain financing, and the smaller ones which are finding financing more difficult.
An example of the strong getting stronger is Mori Trust Sogo REIT (8961), which at the end of September announced a capital increase of
Y17.6bn through a private placement from Mori Trust Co. The funds will go to paying down Y20bn in debt from a recent acquisition of a Tokyo
office building. This capital increase is the J-REIT's first since listing in 2004, and increased Mori Trust's stake in the J-REIT from 30
per cent to 38 per cent. The private placement is positive on two fronts, as a public offering, which carries dilution fears, may not have
given the Mori J-REIT the needed funds for debt repayment. As unjust as this scenario may appear, it does provide evidence consistent with
the Investment Adviser's long-held view that many of the smaller J-REITS, which lack such deep pocketed sponsors, would be better off as
private entities.
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a graph depicting S&P 500 Index
Performance.
Source:Bloomberg
Is there encouragement on the way?
The Investment Adviser concludes that an external impetus is required for a re-rating of J-REIT valuations. Re-alignment of the J-REIT
industry can take the form of changes in sponsors, M&A, and privatisations. There have been some instances of sponsor switching since June
2006, but only in the case of Frontier, where Mitsui Fudosan replaced Japan Tobacco as the sponsor, did this involve a J-REIT trading at a
price to book ratio greater than one. Although there have been several cases of high profile foreign investment funds becoming sponsors, the
market reaction has been muted. In the case of foreign funds, investors have most likely been concerned that the J-REIT is simply being used
as an investment vehicle for the sponsor's own fund. Also for all the anecdotal evidence the TSE and FSA are becoming more amenable to M&A
and private offerings, there has been little tangible evidence of changes in systems and procedures which would allow for this. The market
is looking for specific reforms, for example the introduction of a new system such as the umbrella partnership (UPREIT) structure in the US, which confers tax advantages when properties
are sold. One other possibility is to make investment in J-REITS similar to equity investment in general by relaxing the ban on share
buybacks and convertible bond issuance. Such concrete measures are required to restore investor confidence.
Activism: An iterative process:
In what was the first example of a takeover in the J-REIT sector, on August 12 2008, Re-Plus Residential Investment (8986) announced
that it had agreed to a tender offer and a third party capital increase from an affiliate of the US real estate investment group Oak Tree.
The transaction involved the issuance of 70,000 new shares (a 72 per cent increase) at a 6 per cent discount to the last traded price, with
the tender offer coming at a 40 per cent premium.
The placement increased Oak Tree's holding to 37.5 per cent, and the tender, the first for a J-REIT targeted an increase to 48 per cent
of shares outstanding. The funds are intended for short term debt repayment in an overall attempt to lessen credit risk. Subsequently, on 24
September, the J-REIT'S sponsor Re-Plus (8936) filed for bankruptcy. Much of the bankruptcy risk had already been factored into Re-Plus, as
the company's share price had fallen 91 per cent over the previous year. This was the first case of a J-REIT sponsor going bankrupt, and was
no doubt related to the chain of insolvencies declared by mid-size developers. On the day of the bankruptcy announcement, Re-Plus REIT made
a separate announcement declaring it currently did not have cash flow problems, and that the J-REIT's assets were managed separately from
those of the sponsor. After an initial bout of weakness, Re-Plus's shares rebounded as the market re-assessed the risks between developers,
which carry high debt and non performing assets, versus J-REITS which carry much lower debt and have income generating assets. Furthermore, the bankruptcy of a J-REIT sponsor could be
an agent for changing the J-REIT's management structure or a privatisation.
Some measure of hope can be derived from the emergence of self funding investment groups, particularly in the long suffering condominium
space. GE Real Estate Corp announced a tie-up with Meiho Enterprise Corp (8927) in a developer built 12-storey, 48 unit condominium project
in Tokyo's Taito Ward. The partnership is planning another project in 2009, and marks GE's desire for further involvement in Japanese
property. Nomura Real Estate Holdings (3231) is also investing aggressively, spending Y80bn to acquire a 65% stake in Toshiba Corp's (6502)
real estate unit this year. Nomura has also been taking advantage of market weakness to build up its land bank for future condominium
development. Also on September 8 Joint Corporation (8874) announced the issuance of Y4bn in common stock and Y6bn in preferred stock to Orix
Corp (8591), making Joint an Orix affiliate.
Other foreign funds are still aggressively targeting investment in Japan. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs property teams are consistent
investors in Japanese real estate and have shown no loss of appetite for the sector. Earlier this year, Morgan Stanley bought Shinsei Bank's
head office building for Y118bn. Among other foreign players, LaSalle Investment Management is allocating 15 per cent of its global
investment funds to Japan, and ING Real Estate is planning to establish a Japan focused real estate fund. Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are
also expected to increase their presence in Japan. The Government of Singapore already owns such trophy properties such as the Shiodome
City Center and the Westin Hotel, and is supposedly looking for further targets. The Kuwait Investment Authority announced in August plans
to more than triple its investment balance in Japan from US $15bn to $48bn.
To summarize, refinancing risk has trumped any dividend or valuation support in the J-REIT market.
Until credit conditions normalize, the fate of many of the smaller J-REITS may lie in the hands of the banks.
Debt profiles (Top 5 Holdings) as at 31 October 2008
Given the increased focus on the debt profile of J-REIT's, as with many real estate companies globally, the Investment Adviser has set
out below details of the debt profiles of some of the Company's larger holdings as at 31 October 2008.
8963 TGR Investment
Though expansion potential is limited due to a high LTV of 55.9 per cent, the operational business is proceeding steadily, with 95.7 per
cent portfolio occupancy. Internal growth potential comes mainly from office properties (21.8 per cent of portfolio), as management believes
they have achieved market level rents on the other property types.
Next refinancing is 3 August 2009 for Y12bn.
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a graph depicting the Debt Maturity Schedule
of TGR Investment.
Source: Prospect Asset Management Inc.
8970 Japan Single-Residence
JSR experienced some difficulties as plans to consolidate Y17.8bn in loans fell through, due to lenders changing their stance towards
residential real estate. Y10.6bn was refinanced for 1 year for TIBOR + 150bps (+100 bps), Y7.2bn refinanced for TIBOR +100 (unchanged) and
Y670m of refinancing was secured for the Y1.1bn due to refinance at the end of Oct 2008 with the remaining Y422m being repaid with cash on
hand.
JSR should see no substantial effects from Lehman Brothers demise, as the REIT has no debt obligations, warehousing or pipeline concerns
with LB. If/when the LB subsidiary sponsor company goes into bankruptcy, its stake in JSR's management company will be divided between the
two remaining sponsors, Invoice and daVinci.
Next refinancing is 31 January 2009.
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a graph depicting the Debt Maturity Schedule
of Japan Single Residence..
Source: Prospect Asset Management Inc.
8969 Prospect Residential Investment
Next refinancing is November 2008
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a graph depicting the Debt Maturity Schedule
of Prospect Residential Investment.
Source: Prospect Asset Management Inc.
8966 Crescendo
Crescendo plans to engage in a capital recycling strategy with an eye to replacing properties with peaked NOI growth. This holds true in
the case of the 28 July sale of Maia Shibuya Sakuragaoka, which had maintained a mid 5 per cent NOI yield for the past six periods. Based on
reported NOI yield information, the Investment Adviser sees 4 properties (2 office, 2 residential) that are likely candidates for sale.
Appraisal premium to book for these properties ranges from 4.1 ~ 27.5 per cent. Current total debt is Y49.6bn, including Y30bn in bonds.,
90.7 per cent of which is fixed via interest rate swaps. The average interest rate of 1.84 per cent is one of the highest in the portfolio.
Next refinancing is 30 October 2009 for Y20bn.
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a graph depicting the Debt Maturity Schedule
of Crescendo.
Source: Prospect Asset Management Inc.
8980 LCP
Next refinancing is January 2009.
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a graph depicting the Debt Maturity Schedule
of LCP.
Source: Prospect Asset Management Inc.
Debt Profile Chart as at 31 October 2008
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a table depicting the Debt Profiles of the
holdings within the portfolio.
Source: Prospect Asset Management Inc.
Dividend Forecasts
During Q3 to 30 September there were five dividend revisions.
Embedded image removed - please refer to the Company's website www.prospect-epicure.com for a table depicting the dividend revisions of
the underlying holdings within the portfolio.
Source: Prospect Asset Management Inc.
Prospect Epicure J-REIT Value Fund PLC
Investment Adviser's update covering the period post 30 September 2008
Report to Shareholders
The month of October 2008 witnessed unprecedented levels of volatility and very poor performance in global stockmarkets as the effects
of the credit crisis continued to be felt. The Company was impacted in particular due to the performance of the Nikkei 225 and the TSE REIT
indices. The TSE REIT index saw a fall of 23.7 per cent for the month of October, which reflected a fall of 38.0 per cent for the first 28
days before a subsequent recovery of 22.5 per cent over the remaining four days. As the Company employs gearing in its investment strategy,
coupled with investments in some of the more illiquid J-REITs, the share price declines within the portfolio placed significant pressure on
the gearing levels of the Company's subsidiaries. In light of these very difficult market conditions, subsidiaries of the Company actively
liquidated certain positions in order to manage their agreed gearing levels with NikkoCitigroup. Subsequently the Investment Adviser also
sold a number of positions, both in the open market and also to the Parent Company, in order to reduce the gearing levels of the subsidiaries (gearing being defined as total
borrowings/net assets). This excluded cash balances and investments held by the Parent Company in the Isle of Man.
On 28 October 2008, the Investment Adviser and the Board of Directors were pleased to announce that, as at close of business in Tokyo on
28 October 2008, the Company's subsidiaries had met all outstanding margin calls, and that gearing levels were below the pre-existing
maximum permitted limits as set by the prime broker.
During the month of October 2008 there was a drastic re-rating of global equities in general and J-REITs in particular, and the J-REIT
market witnessed increasingly tight credit conditions not dissimilar to a number of other international real estate markets. While the
market had been fully aware credit conditions were tight, few if any market participants conceived the possibility of a J-REIT going
bankrupt. The trigger event for the degradation of J-REIT unit values was the 9 October 2008 bankruptcy protection filing of New City
Residence (8965). Whilst NCRI only represented 2 per cent of the Company's gross assets, this was the first J-REIT to announce bankruptcy
since the asset class was established in 2001; this news added to the negative sentiment across the J-REIT sector, particularly in the small
cap residential space.
The Investment Adviser believes that the deciding factor of New City's bankruptcy was not the asset fundamentals, but rather the lack of
bank confidence in management. Similarly, the poor sentiment towards the sector does not lie with the underlying property portfolios, but
with the reality of Japanese banks' simultaneous efforts to reduce exposure to property related loans. Although NCRI enjoyed high occupancy
rates, strong cash flow, and comfortable debt service, it was unable to refinance existing debt or raise funds for properties it had
committed to buy.
The Investment Adviser believes that there should be proceeds payable to the shareholders of NCRI following the sale of its assets and
settlement of its liabilities as the properties are of generally high quality. However the timing and quantum of any payment cannot be
determined at this stage, and there can be no guarantees that any monies will be payable to shareholders of NCRI. The majority of the small
cap residential J-REITS were marked down limit low each day for the better part of a week, often trading minute daily volumes on the market
close only. These events were the direct cause of the Company's poor recent performance.
In contrast, it is possible that a successful extension of credit can also have just the opposite effect. On October 16 2008 LaSalle
J-REIT (8974) announced a successful refinancing of Y36.2bn in debt through its main bank, SMFG. While the asset profile of LaSalle - 21
properties with 98.3 per cent occupancy - is not dissimilar to NCR, the key differential is that LaSalle has the confidence of the lenders.
Since the refinancing announcement, LaSalle's unit price has rallied more than 40 per cent.
At the end of October 2008, the Company and its subsidiaries held 12 positions (five at subsidiary level and seven at parent company
level), having sold its entire holding in FC Residential and MID REIT. The Investment Adviser continues to actively monitor the gearing
levels of the Company's subsidiaries and at the end of October 2008 this was at 51 per cent.
All the events of recent weeks have seen the market's fears become reality. However, Japan could be entering a phase of credit creation
which would allow shareholders to view investment opportunities in the property market in general, and the J-REIT market in particular, with
a greater degree of optimism." After a period of total inactivity, the government appears to be taking steps to stabilise the property and
credit markets, as evidenced by proposals discussed in late October. At the time of writing, the government and ruling parties are looking
to introduce the largest tax break ever on home mortgages, with a maximum deduction of Y6m ($60k). Looking at the historical record, when
the government introduced a tax break of similar size for new home buyers in 1999, the result was a sharp increase in new housing starts.
These tax breaks may also benefit condominium developers holding inventory of unsold completed units or land they are unable to develop.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of tax breaks on home mortgages would be increased bank lending for home purchases. The decision to have
credit guarantee corporations guarantee 100 per cent of loans to small and medium sized enterprises is also likely to increase credit to
those companies. In short, for all the dire news, it is possible that Japan could be entering a phase of credit creation.
NAV Update
NAV at launch GBP 0.965
NAV as at 25 September 2008 GBP 0.259
The NAV is estimated weekly net of fees and expenses at the close of business every Thursday and announced through the Regulatory News
Service of the London Stock Exchange each Tuesday.
Market Price-Shares, 25 September 2008 GBP 0.295
Market Price-Warrants, 25 September 2008 GBP 0.015
Inception Date November 2006
Key Features
Domicile Isle of Man
Shares Issued 131,000,000
Warrants Issued 20,200, 000
Maturity Continuation vote at 2012 AGM
Gearing Target 100%
* Target Return IRR over 20%
* Dividend semi-annual
Year end 31 December
Annual Fee 1% of GAV
Performance Fee
The performance fee is 20% of the increase in adjusted NAV per share from the placing price of GBP 1.00, subject to the achievement of
two tests (i) the Adjusted NAV per share exceeds an amount equal to the placing price of GBP 1.00 increased by 8% (compound), and a high
watermark.
* These returns are illustrative and based on a number of assumptions (including but not limited to the assumption that J-REITs will
continue to pay dividends and that capital gains will be generated) which may not materialise or be achieved. There can be no guarantee that
the Company will generate the returns set out above. None of the above should be taken as a forecast of profits.
Investment Manager Epicure Managers Japan Ltd.
Investment Adviser Prospect Asset Management Inc.
Administrator Galileo Fund Services Limited, Isle of Man
Custodian Anglo Irish Bank Corporation, (International) PLC
Nominated Broker Panmure Gordon (UK) Limited
Auditor & Tax Adviser KPMG
Legal Adviser Stephenson Harwood
Ordinary Shares
Valoren 2752791
ISIN IM00B1FW6C18
SEDOL B1FW6C1
Bloomberg Ticker PEJR LN Equity
Warrants
Valoren 2787085
ISIN IM00B1FXTQ94
SEDOL B1FXT7Q9
Bloomberg Ticker PEJW LN Equity
Website address: www.prospect-epicure.com
Contact Details
Nominated Adviser & Broker
Panmure Gordon (UK) Limited
Moorgate Hall
155 Moorgate
London EC2M 6XB
Tel: +44 207 459 3600
Website: www.panmure.com
Administrator and Registrar
Galileo Fund Services Ltd.
Third Floor
Britannia House
St George's Street
Douglas
Isle of Man, IM1 1JE
Tel: +44 1624 692600
E-mail enquiries@galileofs.co.im
Website www.galileofs.co.im
Media/PR Contact
Tim Draper
MCommunications
Tel: +44 20 7153 1267
Marylene Guernier
MCommunications
Tel: +44 20 7153 1269
1 Ropemaker Street
Ninth Floor
London
EC2Y 9HT
www.mcomgroup.com
Curtis Freeze Prospect Asset Management
Tel: +1 808 396 7077
Leonard O'Brien Prospect Epicure J-REIT Value Fund PLC
Tel: +41 (0)22 908 1190
This information is provided by RNS
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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